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Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a). 
Statement of Issues 
The Respondents have not provided an individual response to the 
Petitioner's Six issues. It appears to the Petitioner that the Respondents have rather 
consolidated the Petitioner's six issues into their two. 
Respondents' issue 1 seems to consolidate Petitioner's issues 2 and 3. 
Respondents' issue 2 seems to consolidate the Petitioner's Issues 1, 4, 5, and 6. In 
replying to the Respondent's brief the Petitioner will respond as such. 
Statement of the Case 
Petitioner seeks to protect his valued property rights and prevent 
unnecessary tree trimming. 
The Petitioner's and Respondents' statement of proceedings and events have 
been stated without much disagreement and therefore will not be repeated here. 
However, the Respondents' statements of "relevant facts" (Respondent's 
Brief, p.2) and "the fundamental fact at issue became the reasonableness of 
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PacifiCorp guidelines"(Respondent Brief, p. 6) are in dispute. The real issues 
related to these statements are: 
1. whether or not the Petitioner's property will be irreparably harmed by 
implementation of these guidelines? 
• Answer: Yes 
2. can reduced clearances and more frequent trimming or some other 
alternative also meet (Electric Service Regulation 6, UAC R746-310-4.D, 
andNESC218? 
• Answer: Yes 
3. the clearances sought truly and objectively the "extent necessary" (Electric 
Service Regulation 6 (2)(c)) or more objectively "desired" clearances? 
• Answer: Desired 
4. these new guidelines and clearances inconsistent with past practice and 
regulation, and therefore causing an increased and illegal burden on the 
servient property? 
• Answer: Yes 
The Respondents' Brief frequently and heavily relies on legalese and 
technicalities to discredit the Petitioners' issues and relevancy for review. This 
court should and must understand that the Petitioner had no reason to believe he 
would need to go to this extent to protect his property. And legalese and 
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technicalities should not usurp the legal systems duty to accept, seek and require 
all evidence when it comes to protection of constitutionally protected rights and 
due process. Further the court should recognize the following: 
1. The Petitioner is merely trying to defend his Constitutional Property Rights 
2. The Petitioner is not trained in law but is defending his rights as best 
possible with limited resources. 
3. The Petitioner attended the initial hearing rightfully expecting: 1) it to be 
independent in reality not just appearance, 2) the need to provide evidence 
that the clearances sought were more than necessary, 3) the burden of proof 
was upon PacifiCorp to proof the need. The fact is these rightful 
expectations were not realized. 
4. The Petitioner should have been granted a rehearing by the Public Service 
Commission (PSC). It is not until the PSC's refusal to grant a rehearing that 
the Petitioner's due process rights are unequivocally violated. They refused 
a rehearing and admitting additional evidence despite: 1) stating a need for 
more evidence in the order (R0040 p.6), 2) knowing it would cause 
irreparable harm to Petitioner's property, 3) believing something less would 
be sufficient. 
5. The Petitioner is not attempting to drop the burden of argument, research 
and following appellate procedure. Quite the contrary, every step along this 
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way is a new learning process and every effort is made to "follow rules" and 
much effort is made researching relevant statutes and cases for argument. 
Summary of Argument 
1. The Petitioner has preserved the issues for review and presented his 
arguments. 
The issues presented in the Petitioners Brief may not directly correlate with the 
issues presented in the Petition for Rehearing (R0048). However, the points and 
principles associated with each of the six issues are contained and included in the 
Petition for Rehearing. The record provides numerous references to: 1) easement 
rights (i.e. property rights), 2) irreparable harm to Petitioner's trees, 3) Petitioner's 
property itself. Specific Citations will be provided in Argument to follow. The 
Petitioner presumes the Administrative Law Judge is trained in law and therefore 
should have recognized these as property rights protected by both the Federal and 
State Constitutions (Utah State Constitution, Art. 1,7, 11, 22.) and afforded due 
process, and therefore clearly and unequivocally placing the burden of proof on 
PacifiCorp throughout this process. This was not the case. The fact that 
PacifiCorp's tree trimming guidelines are contrary to past practice, arbitrary 
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themselves, and will cause irreparable harm to the Petitioner's property makes the 
implementation of supporting rule or law arbitrary and capricious. 
The Petitioner did "marshal the evidence" in Petitioner's Brief p.9. However, 
the Petitioner did miss the Citations of Mathews v. Georgia Power Co,. Motto v. 
West Penn Power Co, and Re Connecticut Light and Power Co. as they were 
footnotes from PacifiCorp Motion to Dismiss (R0006 p.5 n. 10). Otherwise the 
Petitioner has stated the same evidence facts that the Respondents' Brief provides, 
though not to the same detail. If that detail is required then for further argument 
sake the Petitioner will address the "marshaled evidence" the Respondents' Brief 
provides. 
2. The Commission's Determination was not supported by substantial 
evidence and was not otherwise in accordance with law. 
The issue was not supported by substantial evidence as the Order (R0040 p.6) 
even says the PSC has "reason to believe less than" the PacifiCorp guidelines 
would be sufficient. This itself shows doubt on the part of the PSC and indicates 
the substantial evidence test has not been passed. Further it is evident that the PSC 
provided undue deference to hearsay, circumstantial and opinion testimony over 
hard physical evidence which is not appropriate. 
Contrary with law: l)The order shows that the PSC erred by placing the burden 
of proof on the Petitioner to show clearance was not necessary as opposed to 
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PacifiCorp proofing the clearances were necessary. 2) The PSC also failed to fulfill 
its duties to investigate. (UCA §54-4-2., UCA §54-4a-L). 3) The Order represents 
a new drastic change in regulation of a service that is inconsistent with past 
regulation. 4) Mostly the PSC violated the due process rights of Petitioner by not 
granting the Rehearing and addressing the evidentiary needs alluded to in the 
Order and allowing the irreparable harm to Petitioner's property and ignoring law 
knowing there had been no resolution on the property rights issues related to 
easements. 
Argument 
L The issues relating to errors in the finding of facts based on the 
quantum and quality of the evidence are preserved in the appeal for 
rehearing. 
The Petition for Rehearing (R0048) contains several references questioning and 
challenging the evidence and findings of facts: 
1. "The Commission has totally influenced by PacifiCorp" (R0048 
p.2)_ 
2. Petitioner questions the finding of facts given the uncontradicted evidence 
that desired clearances have not been maintained for 30 years and further 
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asks "what is 'necessary'" since no evaluation or investigation was made by 
the PSC (R0048 p.3). 
3. The Petitioner challenges the "validity and weight" and the need to seek 
additional information. (R0048 p.5). Further, Petitioner points out that 
PacifiCorp testimony is contradicted by the hard physical evidence and has 
"come nowhere close to demonstrating the need" for there clearances. 
(R0048p.5). 
4. Petitioner provides numerous challenges to the validity of testimony and 
evidence that the PSC accepted with undue deference. (R0048 p.6). 
5. Petitioner points out that his proposed clearances and trimming request 
could also meet the NESC requirements. (R0048 p.6). Moreover, he points 
out that if the sought guidelines are valid, then PacifiCorp has knowingly 
allowed an unsafe situation and subject to fine.(R0048 p6-7). 
6. Petitioner states "commission has shown unfair 
deference contradictions and questionable validity the dubious 
and speculative nature of PacifiCorp's claims" (R0048 p. 8). 
The Petitioner's Response to PacifiCorp's Opposition to Petition for Rehearing 
(R0053) once again contains numerous reference related to the evidence and 
finding of facts. 
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1. Petitioner raised the following issues related to evidence "No independent 
opinion", "commission erred", "testimony conflicts with 
exhibits... .differences with reality questions about its integrity and 
validity", "continually exaggerated the urgency"(R0053 p.l). 
2. The 2nd and 3rd pages of this document contain numerous additional 
challenges related to evidence. 
In the Response Regarding Hearing on May 29, 2003 (R0035) the Petitioner 
raised many of these same questions and challenged the PSC to investigate 
evidence and seek independent opinion. This was prior to the Order (R0048). 
This stemmed from a study of the exhibits and testimony provided by PacifiCorp at 
the May 29 hearing and from the subsequent discussions with PacifiCorp after the 
hearing, which the parties were asked to conduct. 
2. The issues regarding the questions of law are also preserved in the 
record. 
Numerous reference regarding the questions of law are contained in the Petition for 
Rehearing: 
1. "the Commission has erred fully regulate", "Commission has 
avoided its responsibility UCA § 54-4-18", "complainant simply 
requests duty of oversight" (R0048 p.2) 
2. "This is a complete abrogation of statutory duty"(R0048 p.5) 
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3. "The commission should not dismiss the relevancy easement", "duty 
to consider facts of record and law", regarding prescriptive rights "common 
law is quite clear on this" (R0048 p 7). 
4. "failure to invoke any oversight is an abrogation of the 
Commission's duty to the citizens of Utah" (R0048 p. 8) 
The issue concerning violation of Constitutional rights was not realized up until 
the PSC failed to grant a rehearing to address the issues presented to them. They 
failed to do this despite clearly knowing that this entire dispute originated and 
centered on the Petitioner's desire to protect his property. 
3, The order is not supported by substantial evidence 
The Respondent's brief is again attempting to shift the burden of proof or 
persuasion upon the Petitioner. Constitutional property rights and due process 
show that the burden is on the party (PacifiCorp) seeking to take, usurp or diminish 
these rights. Further as it pertains to Utility services, "In the regulation of public 
utilities by government authority, a fundamental principle is: the burden rests 
heavily upon the utility to prove...," see Utah Department of Business Regulation 
v. Public Service Commission 614 P.2d 1242, 1245. This case specifically refers to 
rates but should also extend to associated practices, and more so for practices 
involving the destruction and taking of private property. 
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The Respondents' Brief asserts that it submitted competent evidence that its 
clearances were consistent with other jurisdictions and cited 15 feet in Mathews v. 
Georgia Power Co., 333 S.E.2d 631 (GA. Ct. App. 1985); 8 feet Motto v. West 
Penn Power Co., 1995 WL 945202, *8(Pa. PUC Dec. 8, 1995); and 8 feet, 10 feet, 
15 feet Re Connecticut Light and Power Co., 92 P.U.R. 4th 50(Conn. DPUC Mar. 
23, 1988). Taking a closer look at the context of these distance citations reveals a 
different picture. In Mathews v. Georgia Power Co Mathews was arguing 
Georgia Power should be liable for his injuries for not maintaining the 15 feet, but 
he lost. I guess 15 feet wasn't really required. In Motto v. West Penn Power Co 
West Penn was contesting a PUC fine for excessive trimming, but they lost and the 
PUC's fining of the utility for negligence and unreasonable tree trimming was 
affirmed. Clearly, there are other factors. In Re Connecticut Light and Power Co. 
the distances are not "approved" but I quote "generally, the minimum clearance 
sought. is 8 feet 10 feet 15 feet." Clearly this is different than 
approved or required. Further, the following paragraph in Re Connecticut Light 
and Power Co. states "the requirement under Connecticut General Statutes .. 
...permission to trim must be obtained from the public authority and the adjoining 
property owner. Permission must also be obtained from owners of privately-
owned trees." Clearly, this is more in keeping with the Petitioner's position. 
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Putting these references into context really raises questions as to the competency of 
this evidence. 
Respondents Brief p. 17-18, claims "it submitted competent evidence that its 
clearance distances were consistent with industry best practices..." and ".. .were 
necessary to protect public safety and service reliability..." and ".. .were consistent 
with the National Electric Safety Code (NESC). In reply the Petitioner raises the 
following points: 
1. Regarding "industry best practices": What are they? Where are they 
published? Who developed them? Are they independently developed? The 
fact is we really don't know what these are. 
2. Regarding "necessary": PacifiCorp provided no evidence showing any 
safety or reliability problem associated with the Petitioner's trees, except 
that one branch appeared it may have touched in the past. Petitioner has 
always been supportive of trimming this branch. 
3. Regarding the NESC: The NESC 218 has no specification for any distance. 
In fact NESC is so broad that most anything could be "consistent", 
including reduced clearances and more frequent trimming. 
Further, the Respondent has referred to all this as competent evidence. In fact, 
this is not evidence but rather opinion testimony and is not independent. In light of 
the questions raised above the competency itself is questionable. 
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The Respondents Brief p. 18 asserts there is no "actual evidence undermining 
the objectivity" of there evidence and testimony and makes reference to Mr. 
Miller's testimony on tree topping. To the contrary, Mr. Millar is the creator of the 
very clearance guidelines in question. Mr. Miller claims the tree in question was 
properly trimmed and not "topped" (R0074 p77). In fact, by the information in 
PacifiCorp exhibit E(l) (R00140) it was topped and not properly trimmed and 1 
year later it is now dead. This brings into question what the actual results will be 
on Petitioner's remaining trees if trimmed as desired by PacifiCorp. Likely it will 
be more dead trees than testified too. Further, PacifiCorp repeatedly has claimed 
the trimming was urgent and this was always challenged by the Petitioner. Since 
none of the well documented weather/tree related power outages this past year 
occurred or were caused by Petitioner's trees, then clearly the urgency claim was 
in fact exaggerated. All these points raise the doubts about the competency, and 
objectivity of PacifiCorp's testimony. Just how exaggerated are their other claims? 
The Respondent states (Brief p. 18) that the uncontroverted evidence is that 
the clearance distances are consistent with the NESC. This is not true and has been 
addressed above. Further, where is the line drawn for "practical" (see NESC 218 
(2)) when it comes to the destruction of the underlying property owner's rights? 
Further, they state (Respondents Brief p 18-19) "Taylor, provided no 
substantial evidence trimming would violate law .or were otherwise 
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unreasonable." This is not true, as Taylor provide actual hard and empirical 
evidence that the clearances sought are far in excess of 30 years of historical 
clearances without any evidence of safety or reliability issues. This is not opinion 
but observable fact. And PacifiCorp presented no evidence to contradict this fact. 
Given all the evidence (opinion testimony) provide by PacifiCorp and in the 
absences of contradictory evidence PacifiCorp's guidelines could be viewed as 
reasonable. However, when reconciled with the contradictory hard evidence it 
does not hold up. See Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68, "the 
"substantial evidence test" is both a qualitative and "quantitative" inquiry 
(substantial evidence test requires court to consider contradictory evidence, and the 
evidence required to support agency determination "is greater than that required 
under the fany competent evidence' standard of review"). From a qualitative 
perspective the "hard historical" evidence is clearly superior to the opinion and 
circumstantial evidence provided by PacifiCorp. See also Charles Caster dba Back 
Yard Auto v. West Valley City 2001 UT App 220; 29 P.3d 22; 23, "Substantial 
evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." An actual onsite visit 
(investigation) will show many of PacifiCorp's claims don't pass the "laugh test." 
And actually, the sought trimming could reasonably decrease safety and reliability 
by causing stress and disease in the trees and result in larger and further away 
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branches falling on power lines. See also UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATION,, v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 614 P.2d 1242, "The 
commission may not, however, defer to bald assertions by management. This is so 
particularly when more compelling evidence...." Much of PacifiCorp's 
testimony/evidence is in fact "bald assertions" from PacifiCorp management. 
The PSC Order (R0040 p.6) does not say the PacifiCorp guidelines are 
reasonable. To the contrary it says "they have reason to believe less would 
be sufficient. This further indicates that the substantial evidence standard has not 
been passed and the Order doesn't logically follow its own findings. 
4. The Order and subsequent refusal for Rehearing was not within the 
law. 
PacifiCorp's argument for asserting that the Order is within the law has been 
based primarily upon: 1) UAC R746-310-4.D. 2) Electric Service Regulation 6 (c) 
and 3) NESC 218(1). This in and of itself is fine. However the Court should 
consider: 1) the intent behind these rules and laws, 2) recognize that clearance 
guidelines significantly different from PacifiCorp's could also meet NESC 218, 3) 
Electric Service Regulation 6 only grants access to trim to the extent necessary and 
there is substantial hard historical evidence that PacifiCorp will be trimming more 
than necessary. 
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Petitioner thinks it is fair to say the intent of these rules is to grant the utility 
fairly broad discretion regarding property access and tree trimming to handle 
service outage emergencies. However, this broad discretion should not extend to 
everyday service maintenance when it entails significant destruction and harm to 
the underlying property owner. Under these circumstances a more narrow 
interpretation should be used and deference should be given to constitutional 
property right protections. And there should be very compelling evidence required 
that the extent of tree trimming is necessary. The Petitioner paid valuable 
consideration for these trees and the property, which has no recorded easements 
over it. The Order effectively is allowing the taking of property without equitable 
compensation and allowing for and increased burden on the servient property, the 
first of which is unconstitutional and the second is illegal (see McBride v. 
McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). "The right cannot be enlarged to place a 
greater burden or servitude on the property." 
Despite the undeniable and irreparable harm this trimming will cause, 
acknowledging a need for more information in the Order, expressing doubts about 
the extent necessary, and telling PacifiCorp in the Order there guidelines were not 
approved, the PSC rejected a Rehearing. By doing so the PSC has clearly erred 
and violated Taylor's due process rights by not seeking and accepting additional 
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relevant evidence supporting the protection of the Petitioner's property and failed 
to resolve all the issues. 
By doing so the Petitioner has been substantial prejudiced, since it will result 
in significant damage and death to many of the Petitioner's trees, see Savage 
Industries, Inc., v. Utah State Tax 811 P.2d 664 
"The phrase "substantial prejudice" within subsection (4) refers to the 
"person seeking review." It does not modify the actual standards of 
review found within subsection (4). This means that the person 
seeking review of an agency action must suffer substantial prejudice 
as a result of that action before [*17] a court may grant relief from the 
action. This portion of subsection (4) relates to the damage or harm 
suffered by the person seeking review and was written to ensure that a 
court will not issue advisory opinions reviewing agency action when 
no true controversy has resulted from that action. The phrase simply 
does not relate to the degree of deference a court must give an agency 
decision. 
In this case, Savage has been substantially prejudiced by the 
Commission's decision denying its petition for redetermination. 
Savage's subsidiaries have been denied the use of over $ 300,000 in 
tax deductions in the form of loss carryovers. Therefore, the 
substantial prejudice requirement of subsection (4) is clearly met." 
The agency's action as applied are currently unconstitutional, not all of the 
issues are resolved, and the action is not supported by substantial evidence 
Therefore the Petitioner should be granted relief (UC A §63-46b-16, 4 (a)(b)(g). 
Also, and stated many times before, the PacifiCorp guidelines are completely 
inconsistent with the past practice of 30 years. The fact that the PSC has accepted 
and allowed such a different standard for all these years without investigating, 
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fining, conducting hearings, etc. it has de facto established regulation standards 
inconsistent with this action. The Order is inconsistent with past regulation of tree 
trimming practices and is inappropriately allowing PacifiCorp to self regulate and 
provides Carte Blanche to abuse individual property rights without justification. 
Therefore the Petitioner should be granted relief under (UCA §63 46b-16 4(h)(iii). 
Conclusion 
At some point in the process the public institutions established to protect the 
publics and individual's rights should show an interest in doing so, as to date the 
PSC has done the opposite. The PSC has clearly shown more interest in avoiding 
their regulation duties and the investigation of PacifiCorp's practices. It is no 
wonder that PacifiCorp acts with such hubris. By allowing PacifiCorp to self 
regulate its practice the PSC further emboldens PacifiCorp's hubris and abuse of 
individual property rights. 
The Petitioner is not trying to compete on legalese and technicalities. He is 
merely trying to obtain a reasonable level of respect and protection of his property. 
It is clearly wrong that an individual should need to go to these lengths. Hopefully, 
this court will look for the intent behind the rules, laws, and all the evidence (see 
also R0035 and R0048) and see that the Petitioner's property rights are 
unnecessarily or more than necessarily being abused. 
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The PSC Order is not support by substantial evidence. The PSC erred in not 
granting a rehearing and the order as applied is not in accordance with the law. 
The Order is inconsistent with past regulation of PacifiCorp trimming practices. 
Therefore the Court should correct the errors and require reduced clearances 
and more frequent trimming to mitigate the damage to Petitioner's property. 
Hopefully by doing so it will affect a positive change for the many aggrieved 
property owners who simply don't have the resources and the will to challenge the 
"stacked deck" this citizen has experienced in seeking just and fair treatment of his 
property rights. The Petition for Review should not be dismissed. 
18 
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Article I, Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to 
acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; 
to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial 
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any 
tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. 
54-4-2. Investigations — Hearings and notice — Findings. 
Whenever the commission believes that in order to secure a compliance with the provisions of 
this title or with the orders of the commission, or that it will be otherwise in the interest of the 
public, an investigation should be made of any act or omission to act, or of anything 
accomplished or proposed, or of any schedule, classification, rate, price, charge, fare, toll, rental, 
rule, regulation, service or facility of any public utility, it shall investigate the same upon its own 
motion, and may fix a time and place for a hearing thereof with notice to the public utility 
concerning which such investigation shall be made, and upon such hearing shall make such 
findings and orders as shall be just and reasonable with respect to any such matter. 
54-4a-l. Establishment of division — Functions. 
(1) There is established within the Department of Commerce a Division of Public Utilities 
that may: 
(a) commence original proceedings, file complaints, appear as a party, present factual 
information and evidence, examine witnesses, advocate policy recommendations, commence 
appeals, otherwise participate in proceedings before the Public Service Commission, and engage 
in all other activities consistent with its statutory responsibilities; 
(b) commence original proceedings, file complaints, appear as a party, appeal, and otherwise 
represent the public interest in matters and proceedings involving regulation of a public utility 
pending before any officer, department, board, agency, commission, governmental authority, or 
court of Utah, of another state, or of the United States, and may intervene in, protest, resist, or 
advocate the granting, denial, or modification of any petition, application, complaint, or other 
proceeding, or any decision or order of any of those governmental authorities; 
(c) investigate or study, upon complaint, upon order of the Public Service Commission, or 
upon its own initiative, any matter within the jurisdiction of the commission; 
I 
(d) conduct audits and inspections, or take enforcement actions regarding any matter within 
the jurisdiction of the commission in order to insure compliance with decisions, orders, and 
policies of the Public Service Commission, either upon order of the commission or upon its own 
initiative; 
(e) require any person or entity subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission 
to: 
(i) provide information, reports, and other data compilations relevant to matters within the 
jurisdiction of the commission; 
(ii) provide access to inspect and copy records and other data compilations relevant to matters 
within the jurisdiction of the commission; 
(iii) permit inspection of properties and tangible things used in providing public utility 
service; and 
(iv) engage in other methods of discovery authorized by the commission; 
(f) receive complaints from any person or entity regarding matters within jurisdiction of the 
Public Service Commission; 
(g) review applications filed with the Public Service Commission and present 
recommendations to the commission on the disposition of those applications; 
(h) make recommendations regarding public utility regulatory policy and long-range planning 
on matters within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission; and 
(i) engage in settlement negotiations and make stipulations or agreements regarding matters 
within the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission. 
(2) (a) Any investigations, studies, audits, inspections, enforcement actions, or requests for 
discovery of information pursuant to Subsection (1) (c), (d), or (e), shall be preceded by 
reasonable advance notice to the person or entity against whom investigation, study, audit, 
inspection, enforcement, or discovery is sought. 
(b) The targeted person or entity may require that a complaint or other formal proceeding be 
instituted with the Public Service Commission prior to the commencement of the investigation, 
study, audit, inspection, enforcement, or discovery by the division pursuant to Subsection (1) (c), 
(d),or(e). 
(3) Any settlements, stipulations, or other forms of compromise or agreement negotiated 
by the division shall be approved by the commission before becoming effective 
54-4-18, Electric, gas, and water service. 
The commission shall have power, after a hearing, to ascertain and fix just and reasonable 
standards, classifications, regulations, practices, measurements or service to be furnished, 
imposed, observed and followed by all electrical, gas and water corporations; to ascertain and fix 
adequate and serviceable standards for the measurement of quantity, quality, pressure, initial 
voltage or other conditions pertaining to the supply of the product, commodity or service 
furnished or rendered by any such public utility; to prescribe reasonable regulations for the 
examination and testing of such products, commodity or service, and for the measurement 
thereof; to establish reasonable rules, regulations, specifications and standards to secure the 
accuracy of all meters and appliances for measurements; and to provide for the examination and 
testing of any and all appliances used for the measurement of any product, commodity or service 
of any such public utility. 
II 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to 
review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the appropriate 
appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize 
the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has 
failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making body 
or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
A. Station Instruments — Utilities shall install the instruments necessary to obtain a record 
of the load on their systems, showing at least the monthly peak and a monthly record of the 
output of their plants. Utilities purchasing electrical energy shall install the instruments 
necessary to furnish information regarding monthly purchases of electrical energy, unless 
those supplying the energy have already installed instruments from which that information 
can be obtained. 
Ill 
Utilities shall maintain records indicating the data obtained by station instruments. 
B. Voltage and Frequency Restrictions — 
1. Unless otherwise directed by the Commission, the requirements contained in the 1995 
edition of the American National Standard for Electrical Power Systems and Equipment-
Voltage Ratings (60 Hz), ANSI C84.1-1995 (R2001), incorporated by this reference, shall be 
the minimum requirements relative to utility voltages. 
2. Utilities shall own or have access to portable indicating voltmeters or other devices 
necessary to accurately measure, upon complaint or request, the quality of electric service 
delivered to its customer to verify compliance with the standard established in Subsection 
R746-310-4(B)(1). Utilities shall make periodic voltage surveys sufficient to indicate the 
character of the service furnished from each distribution center and to ensure compliance 
with the voltage requirements of these rules. Utilities having indicating voltmeters shall 
keep at least one instrument in continuous service. 
3. Utilities supplying alternating current shall maintain their frequencies to within one 
percent above and below 60 cycles per second during normal operations. Variations in 
frequency in excess of these limits due to emergencies are not violations of these rules. 
C. Station Equipment — 
1. Utilities shall inspect their poles, towers and other similar structures with reasonable 
frequency in order to determine the need for replacement, reinforcement or repair. 
D. General Requirements — Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the requirements 
contained in the National Electrical Safety Code, as defined at R746-310-1(B)(13), 
constitute the minimum requirements relative to the following: 
1. the installation and maintenance of electrical supply stations; 
2. the installation and maintenance of overhead and underground electrical supply and 
communication lines; 
3. the installation and maintenance of electric utilization equipment; 
4. rules to be observed in the operation of electrical equipment and lines; 
5. the grounding of electrical circuits. 
IV 
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Company's Installation 
L COMPANY'S INSTALLATION 
Except as otherwise provided in these. Regulations, an Electric Service Agreement, or the 
Electric Service Schedules, the Company will install and maintain its lines and equipment 
on its side of the Point of Delivery, but shall not be required to install or maintain any lines 
or equipment except meters and accessories beyond that point. Only the Company is 
authorized to make the connections at the Point of Delivery* Electric service furnished 
under this tariff will be alternating current, 60 hertz, single or three-phase, at one of the 
nominal standard voltages available from the Company at or near the Customer's location. 
2. COMPANY FACILITIES ON CUSTOMER'S PREMISES 
(a) All materials furnished and installed by the Company on the Customer's premises, 
shall be, and remain, the property of the Company. The Customer shall not break the 
Company's seals. In the event of loss or damage to the Company's property, arising 
from neglect, carelessness, or misuse by the Customer, the cost of necessary repairs 
or replacement shall be paid by the Customer. 
(b) Customer without expense to the Company shall make or procure conveyance to the 
Company of satisfactory Rights-of-Way Easements across the property owned or 
controlled by the Customer for the Company's lines or extensions thereof necessary 
_or:JT)e[dei^aljojh^ furnishing of service to theiZustpmer. _^  
(c) The Customer shall permit access by. the Company's representatives at all hours to 
maintain electric distribution facilities on the Customer's premises. The Customer 
shall permit the Company to trim trees and other vegetation to the extent necessary 
' -^ to avoid interference with the Company's lines and to protect public safety. 
(d) The Customer shall give the Company the right to enter the Customer's premises, at 
reasonable times, for the purpose of reading meters, inspecting, repairing or 
removing metering devices and wiring of the Company, 
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217A5 218. Tree Trimming 218B 
other climbing hazards such as tacks, nails, vines, and through bolts not properly 
trimmed. 
5. Decorative Lighting 
Attachment of decorative lighting on structures shall not be made without the concur-
rence of the owners and occupants. 
B. Unusual Conductor Supports 
Where conductors are attached to structures other than those used solely or principally for 
their support, all rules shall be complied with as far as they apply. Such additional 
precautions as may be deemed necessary by the administrative authority shall be taken to 
avoid damage to the structures or injury to the persons using them. The supporting of 
conductors on trees and roofs should be avoided. 
218. Ti-ee Trimming 
A. General 
1. Trees that may interfere with ungrounded supply conductors should be trimmed or 
removed. 
NOTE: Normal tree growth, the combined movement of trees and conductors under adverse 
weather conditions, voltage, and sagging of conductors at elevated temperatures are among the 
factors to be considered in determining the extent of trimming required. 
2. Where trimming or removal is not practical, the conductor should be separated from Hie 
tree with suitable materials or devices to avoid conductor damage by abrasion and 
grounding of the circuit through the tree. 
B. At l ine Crossings, Railroad Crossings, and Limited-Access Highway Crossings 
The crossing span and tiie adjoining span on each side of the crossing should be kept free 
from overhanging or decayed trees or limbs that otherwise might fall into the line. 
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